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From its early days until at least 1996, the first impulse of U.S.
telecommunications policy has always been, "Protect Incumbents." At
the turn of the last century, after two decades of robust competition
between Bell Telephone and rival telephone companies, the U.S.
Department of Justice, in 1914, accepted Bell's arguments in favor of
telephone monopoly and abandoned antitrust enforcement against Bell
in return for Bell's submission to government regulation. 1 Rather than
mandating interconnection among competitors, the government
adopted a course that allowed a single firm to dominate the provision
of telephone service.2 Likewise, following enactment of the Federal
Radio Act of 1927, a new Federal Radio Commission decided (a) not
to expand the amount of spectrum available to radio broadcast, and (b)
to reassign broadcast frequencies across the country under criteria that
favored existing commercial broadcasters. 3  After television came
along, the renamed Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
adopted a geographical pattern of station assignments that limited the
number of plausibly viable television networks to three.4 With the
advent of cable television, the FCC stepped in during the late 1960s to
regulate in a way that would reduce cable's perceived threat to
incumbent over-the-air broadcasting.5 Much of the same story follows
the advent of satellite.6 In the 1990s, the FCC and Congress decided
to compel a national transition to digital broadcasting and limited the
first round of digital broadcast licenses to existing broadcasters.7 In
1 STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 697-701 (Carolina
Academic Press 2d ed. 2006).
2 1d. at 701.
3 1d. at 24.
4 Bruce M. Owen, Structural Approaches to the Problem of Television Network Economic
Dominance, 1979 DUKE L.J. 191, 211-14 (1979) (explaining how FCC's pattern of VHS
licensing decisions made no more than three over-the-air television networks initially viable).
5 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).
6 See Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988)
(permitting satellite providers to transmit signals from distant network broadcast stations only
to households unserved by any local affiliate of the same network), codified at 17 U.S.C. §
119, as amended by the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-113,
113 Stat. 1501 (1999), and the Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of
2004, Pub. L. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004).
7 Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Television and the Allure ofAuctions: The Birth and Stillbirth of
DTV Legislation, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 517, 532 (1997).
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sum, the telecommunications innovation we have enjoyed has arrived
substantially in spite of, not because of, our public policy.
With the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, it
appeared as if Congress and the FCC might sing a new song, at least
with regard to telephony. An entirely new statutory framework was
created, for telephony that was intended to encourage unprecedented
competition in the provision of telephone service. Incumbent
operators of local telephone networks were forced to share their local
loops with independent carriers as a precondition for incumbent entry
into long distance markets.8  With the explosion of a whole new
telecom sector - namely, Internet service - the FCC also shaped a
scheme of so-called reciprocal compensation that generated enormous
revenues for, and thus helped to underwrite startup "internet service
providers" or ISPs. It appeared that hundreds - or thousands - of
entrepreneurial flowers might bloom.
On the mass media side, however, the old tune of incumbent
protection was still playing. Decisions to lift ownership caps for radio
licensees led to profound concentration in the radio market.1 ° Lifting
cross-ownership limits put many newspaper, television, and radio
outlets in the hands of the same firms. 11 Relaxing the cable-broadcast
cross-ownership rules put ninety percent of the top fifty cable stations
into the hands of the same companies that own the major television
networks. 12 Not surprisingly Americans are now getting less variety in
programming and less locally oriented programming over their
radios. 13
8 Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
9 In re Access Charge Reform, 12 F.C.C.R. 15982 (1997) (first report and order).
10 COMMON CAUSE, THE FALLOUT FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996:
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED 10-11 (2005), available at
http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/{FB3CI 7E2-CDDI -4DF6-92BE-
BD4429893665}/FALLOUTFROMTHETELECOMMACT_5-9-05.PDF.
" Id. at 5.
12 id.
13 FCC, Do Local Owners Deliver More Localism? Some Evidence From Local Broadcast
News (FCC Working Paper, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/
attachmatch/DOC-267448Al.pdf (concluding that local ownership results in additional local
news coverage); PETER DICOLA, Do Radio Companies Offer More Variety When They Exceed
the Local Ownership Cap?, in Does Bigger Media Equal Better Media? Four Academic
Studies of Media Ownership in the United States 38-49, (Benton Foundation 2006)
(concluding that large radio groups offer a narrower and less balanced range of formats than
smaller radio groups).
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The FCC, prodded in part by the courts, decided to eliminate rules
that limited the capacity of the already dominant television networks to
own syndication rights in their programming.14 A judicial opinion by
Judge Richard Posner explained why this ought to be a boon for the
independent production companies that the old rules were designed to
protect. 15 In the real world, elimination of these rules has devastated
the independent television production industry; 6 every major network
now is integrated with one or more production studios under common
ownership. The big seem to get bigger, the independent tend to
disappear.
Against this background, it seemed possible that the 109th
Congress would significantly revamp the statutory framework for
telecommunications regulation - again, largely in favor of the newly
consolidated telephone industry. 18 A key impetus for the measure was
the desire to ease the way for telephone companies to get into the
business of delivering video programming. 19 In June 2006, the Senate
Commerce Committee approved proposed legislation that would
14 See Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282 (second
report and order) (1993).
15 Schurz Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (vacating the financial
interest and syndication rules as "arbitrary" and "capricious").
16 "To get a flavor of how consolidated the industry has become, consider this: In 1990, the
major broadcast networks - ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox - fully or partially owned just 12.5
percent of the new series they aired. By 2000, it was 56.3 percent. Just two years later, it had
surged to 77.5 percent." Ted Turner, My Beef With Big Media, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug.
2004, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0407.tumer.html.
17 The Disney-ABC Television Corporate Group includes the ABC television network and
Touchstone Television, Walt Disney Television Animation, Buena Vista Worldwide
Television and Walt Disney Television International, as production and syndication arms.
General Electric owns NBC Television and NBC Universal. See Disney-ABC Television
Group Fact Sheet, http://www.disneyabctv.com/division/pdf/ABCTelevision.pdf (last visited
Mar. 2, 2007). CBS Corporation owns CBS Television and CBS Paramount Television. See
CBS Corporation, Our Company, http://www.cbscorporation.com/our-company/
index.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). News Corporation owns the Fox broadcast network, as
well as Twentieth Century Fox Television, its production studio. See News Corporation,
www.newscorporation.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). The CW network is a joint venture of
CBS and Warner Bros., a subdivision of Time-Warner.
18 Bara Vaida, Clashing High-Tech Titans, NAT'L J., Sept. 24, 2005, at 2918, 2919 ("The
heavily regulated Bells are looking to Congress and the FCC, as well as to state leaders, for
regulatory relief in their effort to gain a competitive edge.").
19 David Nather, GOP Sees Best Bet in Stuffed Agenda, CONG. Q. WKLY REP., Sept. 4, 2006, at
2300, 2321.
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streamline video franchising procedures, clarify the regulatory status
of Internet telephony, reform the universal service fund, and authorize
municipal broadband systems, among other measures.
A casual observer might be forgiven for thinking that, throughout
the legislative debates, the public interest was well represented by a
wide array of grass roots groups bringing diverse perspectives to bear.
After all, members of Congress were hearing from organizations with
such inspiring names as Consumers for Cable Choice, the New
Millennium Research Council, MyWireless.org, Hands Off the
Internet, TV4US, and The Future ... Faster. In truth, many of these
organizations, including the ones just named, were just "astroturf,"
industry-funded faux mouthpiece organizations masquerading as grass
roots politics. AT&T alone provides substantial support to Consumers
for Cable Choice, the New Millennium Research Council, Hands Off
the Internet, and TV4US.2'
Until just a few months prior to this writing, it seemed as if non-
incumbent points of view were being drowned out. Seemingly
overnight, however, an unexpected coalition of public interest groups,
including MoveOn.org and the Christian Coalition - backed by some
powerhouse Internet companies, such as Google and Amazon - found
a new issue with which to slow down the march towards more
incumbent protection. 22 They began to organize around the issue of
"net neutrality," that is, whether ISPs should be able to offer "tier
pricing" to content providers and web services who want priority in
delivering their "products" to Internet end-users. 23  The ISPs,
themselves now frequently owned by the old media powerhouses,
argue that generating revenues through tier pricing is necessary to
finance the infrastructure investments that will provide America with
the next generation of broadband communications.2 4 Proponents of
20 Id.
21 COMMON CAUSE, WOLVES IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING: TELECOM INDUSTRY FRONT GROUPS AND
ASTROTURF 5, 13 (2006); COMMON CAUSE, WOLVES IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING, PART II: MORE
TELECOM INDUSTRY FRONT GROUPS AND ASTROTURF 5, 7 (2006).
22 Drew Clark, Tangled Net, NAT'L J., July 8, 2006, at 29, 32; Adam Cohen, Editorial
Observer: Why the Democratic Ethic of the World Wide Web May Be About to End, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2006, at 9.
23 Id.; see also Angele A. Gilroy, Cong. Research Serv., Net Neutrality: Background and
Issues (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22444.pdf.
24 DAVID P. MCCLURE, U.S. INTERNET INDUST. ASS'N, NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND TIERED
BROADBAND SERVICES 14 (2006), available at http://instituteforliberty.org/IFC/NN-USIIA.
02052006.pdf.
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net neutrality, however, respond that tier pricing will give a market
advantage to heavily capitalized incumbent firms, and discourage
innovation by smaller entrepreneurs. 25 During the summer of 2006,
the "net neutrality" movement picked up steam, including rallies in
twenty-five cities around the United States.26 As the 109th Congress
neared its end, the prospects for any immediate compromise that
would clear the way for significant new telecommunications
legislation disappeared.
In terms of America's national interests, it would be hard to
overstate what is at stake in the current policy struggle. The lack of a
national broadband strategy has led to a deadening of real competition,
with profound economic costs for both households and businesses.
Many households have access to only one broadband provider, and
nearly one-tenth have none. According to FCC Commissioner
Michael Copps, things are "just as bad" for businesses: "[t]he telecom
merger spree has left many office buildings with a single provider -
leading to annual estimated overcharges of $8 billion.' 29
The stakes are also political and cultural. An America whose
communications infrastructure - including print, telephony, broadcast,
cable, satellite, and the Internet - is controlled by a relatively few giant
firms will simply not be the same as an America in which control is
decentralized. Fewer startups will succeed. The range of new cultural
"products" will be narrower. The opportunities for individuals and
groups to innovate for both private and public good will be reduced.
The quality of our democratic life will be impoverished.
Resisting centralization will be tough. For many Americans the
trajectory of change in the world of communications is likely to seem
positive no matter who is in charge. Opportunities for self-expression
and the acquisition of information will be somewhat greater tomorrow
than they are today. However, the hegemony of the most powerful
companies will be greater, and the opportunities for the rest of us will
not expand to anything near their full potential. Furthermore, the
public policy stakes for most people are easily obscured by the
25 Lawrence Lessig, In Support of Net Neutrality, 3 ISJLP 185 (2007).
26 Anne Broache, Net Neutrality Fans Rally in 25 Cities, CNET NEws.COM, Aug. 31, 2006,
http://news.com.com/Net+neutrality+fans+rally+in+25+cities/2100-1028_3-6111489.html.
27 Nather, supra note 19, at 2321.
28 Michael J. Copps, America's Internet Disconnect, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at A27.
29 id.
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technical aspects of the telecommunications debate. Most Americans
- perhaps most American legislators - have little idea what "net
neutrality," "universal service," "open access," and so on actually
mean. Finally, in terms of understanding the implications for
American democracy, we seem stuck with a discourse about free
speech that is hopelessly inadequate. Our First Amendment
jurisprudence remains oblivious to the skyrocketing media-driven
costs of political campaigns and the power of media conglomerates
over our political and cultural discourse. The spontaneous on-air
utterance of a single vulgar word can subject a broadcaster to
substantial administrative fines, 30 but a broadcaster's failure to
represent fairly competing political positions on matters of public
controversy is beyond the FCC's reach 31 - even if that broadcaster
happens to control two television networks, five major cable networks,
one of America's largest film studios, and one of its largest circulation
daily newspapers, among other media entities.
32
In this environment, the need is compelling to engage both expert
researchers and the public at large in genuine deliberation about
telecommunications and our national future. We are pleased, in this
issue of I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society
("L'S"), to present both scholarly research and expert advocacy that
casts important new light on some of the most important questions
now facing telecom policy makers, both in the United States and
abroad.
Two preliminary thoughts are in order. First, I/S is committed to
providing an important avenue for first-rate analysis, irrespective of
discipline or policy orientation. It will readily be perceived that the
authors in this issue probably disagree with one another on a variety of
points, and some would certainly disagree with the thrust of this brief
introductory essay. In short, when it comes to selecting manuscripts,
30 Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden
Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) (holding that NBC violated 18 U.S.C. §
1464 by broadcasting Bono's exclamation that the award to him of a Golden Globe was
"really, really fucking brilliant").
31 Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987) (repealing the Fairness
Doctrine), aff'd, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
32 Among the more prominent media entities owned by News Corporation are the Fox
Television Stations and MyNetworkTV, the Fox Movie Channel, Fox Sports Channel, Fox
News Channel, FX, and National Geographic, 20th Century Fox, and the New York Post. See
News Corporation, supra note 17.
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there is no I/S editorial line to toe, other than one of quality. Our
objective is to offer a spectrum of different points of view, all
skillfully presented. Second, it is our policy to accept not only
research articles in conventional academic form, but also less formal
commentaries. We especially welcome statements of position by
notable expert participants in public debates and short essays that may
contribute to intellectual discussion even in a relatively brief, less fully
developed form. The commentaries in this issue qualify under both of
these criteria.
The five research articles in the current issue focus on some of the
most contentious topics in telecom reform: video distribution and
broadband penetration, municipal broadband, media concentration,
and universal service. In The Impact of Video Service Regulation on
the Construction of Broadband Networks to Low-Income
Households,33 George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky, and Lawrence J.
Spiwak argue that easing the barriers to the sale of video along with
voice and broadband Internet service will have a socially significant
positive externality - it will promote the deployment of advanced
communications networks in low-income areas. Using census data
and a computer simulation of network deployment under varying
conditions, they seek to demonstrate that those firms allowed to offer
video service will build out to reach low-income households to a
substantially greater degree than firms that can offer only broadband
Internet access or broadband plus telephony. The analysis suggests
how the high demand for video among low income households can be
used as a lever for overcoming a race and income divide in terms of
household broadband availability.
Rationalizing the Municipal Broadband Debate34 by Michael J.
Santorelli looks at another and increasingly popular strategy for
accelerating broadband deployment, namely, municipal involvement in
the building, ownership, or management of broadband networks.
Santorelli identifies potential difficulties with either legislative
preemption of such municipal involvement or a full-fledged municipal
takeover of responsibility for network construction and operation.
Although he tends to see markets as adequate to meet community
needs, Santorelli sets forth a framework of principles for evaluating
when public-private partnerships in the provision of broadband service
might usefully accelerate broadband availability.
33 George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Impact of Video Service
Regulation on the Construction of Broadband Networks to Low-Income Households, 3 ISJLP
13 (2007).
34 Michael J. Santorelli, Rationalizing the Municipal Broadband Debate, 3 ISJLP 43 (2007).
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The concentration of media ownership is the focus of Media
Diversity and Substitutability. Problems with the FCC's Diversity
Index. 5 Adam Marcus argues against the trend of allowing increased
concentration in the radio broadcast industry because of supposed
competition from the Internet. He argues that the Internet is not a
robust substitute for radio, and cannot be expected to offset the loss in
local news and responsiveness to local needs that result from the
concentration of broadcast media. Broadcast media are generally
affected by a market imperfection, namely, that the market for
broadcasters is advertisers, not the general public. Hence, he argues a
return to a broadcaster trusteeship model is needed to restore
broadcaster accountability to the American people.
The policy issues preoccupying U.S. decision makers are hardly
limited to the United States alone. A clear example is "universal
service," a concept subject to a variety of definitions, but which has
historically embodied an aspiration to make affordable telephone
service available to everyone, regardless of income or location. When
telephony is a monopoly service, it is possible to pursue universal
service through a system of subsidies in which higher-income
customers and lower-cost services help underwrite the cost of lower-
income customers and higher-cost services. Competition makes such a
strategy untenable, and, since the breakup of the old AT&T, the United
States has wrestled with how best to reconceptualize and finance our
universal service objectives.36
Two of the articles that follow illuminate the complexity of
universal service policy with perspectives from two very different
international contexts. In The New Concept of Universal Service in a
Digital Networked Communications Environment,37 Mira Burri
Nenova re-theorizes universal service as a human rights imperative in
a world in which communications and information networks are best
understood as public goods. The immediate target of her rethinking is
the European Union, which of necessity must develop an approach to
universal service obligations that makes sense for all of European
society. In sharp contrast, Jun Xia illuminates the enormous
complexity of achieving universal service in its most basic form for
35 Adam Marcus, Media Diversity and Substitutability: Problems with the FCC's Diversity
Index, 3 ISJLP 83 (2007).
36 JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 333-355 (MIT Press 2005).
37 Mira Burri Nenova, The New Concept of Universal Service in a Digital Networked
Communications Environment, 3 ISJLP 117 (2007).
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the people of China. As documented in Towards a Sustainable
Institutional Arrangement for USOs in China: Current Status, Support
Mechanisms, and Regulatory Governance,38 the Chinese government's
ongoing substantial role in telecommunications service provision does
not necessarily simplify the challenge of arriving at a sound universal
service strategy given the mix of public and private entities involved in
telephone service and the scope of unmet needs, especially in rural
areas.
On the subject of net neutrality, which sunk some legislators'
hopes in 2006 for a comprehensive telecommunications bill, we
present two deeply contrasting commentaries. Net Neutrality is a re-
publication of Professor Lawrence Lessig's influential February 2006
testimony to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, propounding mandatory net neutrality as a necessary
measure to maximize the Internet's potential to generate innovation at
the "edge" of networks. 39 Deeply opposed to this view, Randolph J.
May argues, in Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First
Amendment in the Digital Age,4 ° that neutrality rules would operate as
speech restrictions, potentially infringing on the constitutional rights of
Internet service providers. May recognizes that such mandates might
be analogized to common carrier rules that have long been upheld, but
believes that the constraint on ISP autonomy cannot be justified given
what he takes to be unprecedented citizen access to the channels of
communication.
As the FCC and a new Congress gear up for a fresh foray into
telecommunications reform, we trust that this issue of I/S will enrich
ongoing debates about critical issues. Whether the animating theme
can shift from "Protect incumbents," to "Promote innovation," is very
much at stake.
38 Jun Xia, Towards a Sustainable Institutional Arrangement for USOs in China: Current
Status, Support Mechanisms, and Regulatory Governance, 3 ISJLP 147 (2007).
39 Lessig, supra note 25.
40 Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital
Age, 3 ISJLP 197 (2007).
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